To refer to this article please cite:

Van Dyck, B. (2010) Multiple voices, competing spatial claims: social innovation and the transformation of the Angus Locoshops brownfield site (Montréal). In Edts Oosterlynck, S. , Van den Broeck, J., Albrechts, L., Moulaert, F., Verhetsel, A. "Bridging the gap between planning and implementation. Translating transformative visions into strategic projects" (*forthcoming with Routledge)*

Multiple voices, competing spatial claims: social innovation and the transformation of the Angus Locoshops brownfield site (Montréal) [1]

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INTRODUCTION

Urban brownfield sites are industrial, harbour, railway or military 'idle' spaces. Although they constitute landed property, they are rarely suitable for generating short-term financial profit due to issues of contamination, complex ownership, peripheral location, etc. Private developers ignore them, or put the land on hold until a more lucrative period. Public authorities intervene to remove investment barriers for a variety of reasons, such as public health, security, image, environmental degradation, marginalization, densification strategies and economic development concerns. Likewise, many academic and policy debates discuss brownfields chiefly as a rational management problem, in which the main issue becomes the 'removal' of the brownfield. Yet, I argue here that from a social innovation perspective on strategic spatial planning, the definition of policy problems should focus more on substantive questions concerning the nature of the brownfield transformation project, the actors involved, and the project's role in inclusive territorial development.

Examples show that brownfields occasionally give rise to experimental practices that challenge conventional property-led urban development practices (TransEuropeHalles, 2001). Civil society actors, such as residents, socio-cultural and community-based organizations, artists and intellectuals, find ways of expressing their views and engaging in the transformation of abandoned spaces in ways which fit their logic and modes of action (Bouchain, 2008). Such initiatives question predominant physical urban transformation practices, such as redevelopment based on remove-and-replace practices and undemocratic modes of governance. Instead, practices

emerge where no clear boundaries exist between those who imagine, direct, implement, use or benefit from a project; new ways of 'bridging the gap between planning and implementation' become possible.

These new practices emerge, as this chapter shows, when marginalized or hitherto unheard spatial claims are expressed not as particular complaints directed at technocratic procedures, but rather as constructive forms of contestation, which generate public debate about strategic economic projects, constitute new social relationships and change the way in which assets are valued. To demonstrate this, I draw on the body of scholarship on the concept of *social innovation* (Moulaert et al. 2005, Fontan et al. 2005, Klein & Harrisson 2007, MacCallum et al. 2008), which develops helpful analytical approaches for studying the transformation of social relations to benefit socially excluded or less well resourced social groups. My analysis deals with the dynamics that shape the translation of multiple and competing spatial claims into a strategic project by focusing explicitly on the social relations forged during the transformation of brownfields.

To demonstrate how the interaction of competing spatial claims leads to a creative reconfiguration of social relations, I focus on the claims that emerged in the Angus Locoshops brownfield project in Montréal. However, in order to develop an analytical framework for the study of social innovation in brownfield transformation projects, I outline first the theory on brownfields, on strategic projects and on social innovation. Based on the analytical framework then developed, I explore the emergence of a variety of spatial claims in the Angus Locoshops project; how these gained a voice; and to what extent the confrontation between them generated new social relationships. The brownfield transformation project therefore is analysed from an institutional perspective as a governance device through which conflicting claims on spatial planning and development are negotiated, coordinated and operationalized. Finally, the chapter draws conclusions on the relationship between the interaction of competing spatial claims, including those of civil actors, and spatial development and social innovation capacity.

BROWNFIELD TRANSFORMATION PROJECTS FROM A SOCIAL INNOVATION PERSPECTIVE

Brownfield transformation projects as governance devices

In contrast with a rationalist managerial view that supposes linear causal relations[2], an institutionalist view sees strategic projects as devices that coordinate social actors and their actions and thus impact on social relations (for a more elaborate account of institutionalism in planning theory, see chapter 3 in this volume on planning instruments as institutionalised practices). Strategic projects emerged as part of a wider shift in urban

governance. Moulaert, Swyngedouw and Rodriguez (2003) demonstrate how such projects - which they refer to as large scale urban development projects – are an important ingredient in the strategic turn in urban governance. They are strategic spatial interventions that bundle public and private investments into specific locations to achieve policy objectives and goals from different policy sectors at different levels (Albrechts 2006). Moreover, strategic projects are characterized by greater involvement of private actors and civil society in urban decision-making (Van Den Broeck & Verschure, 2004). Thus, strategic projects as governance-devices exemplify new socio-political formations. Brownfield transformation projects are particular forms of strategic projects focused on the redevelopment of brownfield sites.

In strategic spatial planning, brownfields have a particular status because they remain undetermined for a shorter or longer period due to speculation or investment barriers. According to Groth and Corijn (2005), this explains why such places allow for the emergence of non-planned or spontaneous urbanity, and thus the generation of 'other' social relationships. Ambrosino and Andrès (2008) also link the development of creative and political spatial processes to the existence of a temporal indeterminate status of land *('le temps de veille'*). This, they argue, is not simply the moment between the abandoning of a site and its re-use, but the moment at which the strategies of different actors are revealed. It gives an opportunity for the emergence of civil society actor plans in parallel (or not) to the planned interventions of authorities or private landowners.

Obviously, private landowners imagine other possible futures for their (buildable) land than those envisioned by planning authorities, neighbouring residents or shop-owners. The web of emerging interests is complex, yet the identification of and distinction between exchange-value and use-value interests provides a strong explanatory power. Classic writings in urban political economy (Harvey, 1973, Logan & Molotch, 1987) give detailed accounts of the role of exchange and use value in shaping individual and collective claims in the production of space. They show that the nature of land value differs according to the frame of reference of the claimants. For brownfields this is particularly relevant. The availability of temporary undefined space often stimulates different actors to formulate visions and spatial strategies to re-value the site, in a way which matches individual or collective interests. If several actors then manage to translate their vision into a spatial claim, competing claims emerge. I aim to demonstrate here that the way and extent to which strategic projects accommodate different spatial claims both defines, and is defined by, the nature of the brownfield transformation project. Drawing on approaches that see strategic projects as governance devices, a brownfield transformation project is defined here as an ensemble of actors, their strategic actions and the resources they mobilize, the interactions among the actors involved and the mechanisms coordinating

all these, which jointly generate the capacity to induce change in, and through, brownfield spaces.

A social innovation perspective

Strategic projects are increasingly dominated by the principles of market-driven reforms and a drive towards improving the competitiveness of urban economies; as a result, they tend to reinforce existing relations of power, social exclusion and polarization in cities (Moulaert, Swyngedouw & Rodriguez, 2003, Paloscia, 2004, Bornstein, 2007). They are criticized for producing physical, social and economic results that testify to 'wrong choices, missed opportunities and unequal benefit shares' (Gualini & Majoor, 2007: 297). Furthermore, some authors stress the hybridity of rationalities and regulatory processes in shaping projects, and emphasise the capacity of projects to institutionalize collective agency within a diffused power context, owing to their mobilizing capacity, the creation of common goals, language, and a definition of the rules of the game (Avitabile, 2005, Pinson, 2009).

In social innovation literature and related perspectives, it is argued that, in a context in which resources are scattered and governance-beyond-government arrangements become common practice for policy making and implementation, openings for more radical development alternatives are created (Moulaert, 2000, Leitner, Peck & Sheppard, 2006). Focusing on civil society involvement and social economy initiatives, they assess the shaping of alternative urban development trajectories that go beyond assisting strategies of roll-out neoliberalism, and defend the assets of local communities (Fontan et al. 2003). The social innovation perspective argues that mainstream globalization discourses, as well as strong versions of path-dependency (Mendell 2002, Graefe 2004) tend to underestimate, albeit in very different ways, the ability of actors to contest and transform existing institutions. Furthermore, it is argued that opportunities exist for alternative regeneration pathways especially in old industrial zones, which are typically confronted with marginalization, absence of social services and economic investment, as well as an abundance of idle space.

With regard to governance, this literature focuses on innovation in social relations; on an increase in socio-political capability and access to resources (Gerometta, Haussermann & Longo 2005: 2007); on how shifting spatial arrangements create the conditions for different types of social innovation (Novy, Hammer & Leubolt 2008). The mobilization of a combination of exogenous and localized resources is identified as a crucial factor in triggering local initiatives and turning them into collective actions (Klein, Tremblay & Bussières, 2009). According to Klein et al. (2009), this mobilization generates the dynamics necessary to create the conditions for partnerships and local empowerment, which in turn generate a recurring knowledge-building-cycle. This process, according to the authors, is what generates the power to

change institutional structures and so to create social innovation. Nevertheless, in the literature, social innovation is rarely linked to strategic projects as governance-devices. Consequently, and as a part of an effort to address this gap, I aim to analyse how strategic projects can give rise to social innovation in urban governance relations.

Bridging the gap: brownfield transformation projects and social innovation

As will be shown, established brownfield practices are challenged when actors seize on physically visible opportunities for reclaiming space through experimental spatial interventions. The very presence of unoccupied, unallocated buildings and land presents opportunities to respond to unaddressed needs (such as affordable work space), or to establish new links and relations leading to participation in urban governance or entry into the labour market. Approaching brownfield transformation projects from a social innovation perspective thus implies studying how they foster both the reproduction and transformation of social relations. To demonstrate this, I will identify the various spatial claims that emerge in the transformation process of an urban brownfield site to explain the spatial strategies, resource mobilization processes and alliances-despite-differentiated-interests, which shape the brownfield transformation project.

Based on the Angus case study (Montreal), I will give a detailed account of the dynamics of conflict and co-operation within the framework of a brownfield transformation project. The spatial strategies and resource mobilization processes of the Angus brownfield transformation project characterize urban renewal dynamics in an advanced capitalist society. Nevertheless, the project is an interesting case study from a social innovation perspective because of the particular arrangement of territorial actors who engaged with its transformation. On the basis of the Angus Technopôle case study, Fontan, Klein, and Tremblay (2005, 2008) prove their thesis of social innovation in the form of a 'third generation' type of community initiative that is 'neither an exclusively social and endogenous based project nor an exclusively business oriented one, but a project that merges both two dimensions' as elements of the plural economy. The research presented here builds upon earlier work of Fontan, Klein and Tremblay, yet adds new insights; first the project has evolved since their analysis; secondly, the case is analysed from a governance perspective, which stresses how the brownfield transformation is part of the production trend of large-scale and emblematic urban development projects, and therefore adds new questions about the socially innovative nature of the project.

The case study is based on 20 in-depth interviews with civil, private business, political and public sector actors conducted between May 2007 and September 2008, and on the analysis of press articles, and archive documents

that actors involved in the project provided. The extensive research on the case conducted by Fontan, Klein and Tremblay, who themselves played an important role in the early years of the project, has been another important source of primary data (Fontan & Klein 2004, Fontan et al. 2005, Klein et al. 2008). The interviews were transcribed and coded with qualitative research software for references to spatial claims, spatial concepts mobilized, resources activated, interactions and relations with other actors, innovations and impact of the project itself. In the following section, I develop an analysis of the transformation of the Angus Locoshops, which focuses on the confrontation, negotiation and coordination of competing spatial claims that emerged from the brownfield and the social relations it created. In line with the literature on social innovation, I present a case study that stresses the creative reconfiguration of social relations through a brownfield transformation project.

A CENTURY OF ANGUS LOCOSHOPS: FROM INDUSTRIAL *AVANT GARDE* TO DERELICTION AND FORWARD TO NEW ECONOMIC VIBRANCY

The "Angus Locoshops" are located in an industrial neighbourhood east of the inner-city of Montreal. The *Canadian Pacific Railway* (CPR) established the shops for the production and maintenance of its locomotives and rolling material in 1904. The shops were exemplary for the new large-scale production and labour processes of industrial capitalism. The CPR and its immense Angus shops (500 m long on 92 ha of land), employing up to 10,000 workers in its heyday during World War II, directly induced the urbanization of what is today the borough of Rosemont-Petite-Patrie. The Angus workers, often residents of the neighbourhood, passed long hours on the industrial site and depended on it for wages to sustain their families. In turn, the shops in the neighbourhood depended on the workers' purchasing power for their prosperity. For the CPR the Angus site was the location of long-term investments in productive infrastructure and skilled human labour in order to enable the accumulation of capital.

The railway industry was crucial to the rise of Montreal as a political and economic centre of Canada, but was equally important in its decline during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Linteau 2000, Dickinson & Young 2003). Nevertheless, for Montreal itself, the railway industry remained important throughout the twentieth century, yet from the 1950s the number of workers in the Angus shops gradually decreased until the final shut down in January 1992. As part of a general trend towards deindustrialisation and decentralisation of population and economic activity to the suburbs, the factory's closure contributed to the decline of Eastern Montreal (Dickinson & Young, 2003). It left behind vast buildings and 50 ha of contaminated land (the other half of the earlier abandoned area was re-developed during the 1980s). In the last years before closure only a thousand jobs remained. Yet,

the closure of the Angus sites was a serious symbolic slap for East Montreal, which had lost many industrial activities in the previous decade.

The closure of the factories led to a breakdown in long-standing social relations, such as the Angus workers' community, which in itself had already suffered adverse economic effects (job disappearance and decreasing purchasing power). Moreover the image of the neighbourhood further declined and put off new investment. However, not all social relationships disintegrated in and beyond the neighbourhood. The president and chief operating officer of Desjardins Venture Capital (part of the largest financial cooperative group in Canada) and heavily involved himself in the brownfield transformation project remembers that:

> '*he used to hang around in his father's business next to the Angus site in the 1950s, and that day after day he would be impressed by the thousands of men going in and out the factory when the bells rang; all of them wearing the same blue overall, and carrying black metal lunchboxes.'*
>
> (Louis Roquet in interview with author, September 2008)

The emotional link with this particular place partially accounts for the drive to be passionately involved in the transformation of the Angus site. Also the community associations felt closely connected with Angus' history and future. In fact, in Québec the crises of Fordism in the 1970s and 1980s gave rise to a very active social movement engaged in the development of enabling instruments (finance, training, business services and research) for the social economy and local development sector (Mendell, 2006).

One of the main concerns of this movement was the creation of accessible and qualitative jobs (Lamoureux, 2008), aiming to reverse the weak development capacities in territories hit by high unemployment. The establishment of community development corporations or the *Corporations de Développement Economique Communautaire* (CDECs), in different neighbourhoods of the city emerged from this movement. The CDECs brought together local businesses, union representatives, shopkeepers and community groups with the objective of revitalizing their neighbourhoods. As Fontan et al. (2003) explain, the CDECs had been created by social activists and community organizations concerned about the unemployment and poverty that affected a large part of the population in several of Montreal's districts, and were considered important local economic development players by a State looking for solutions in the fight against these ills. The CDECs received public funding and mandates to improve the employability of the local populations, and to support local entrepreneurship (Fontan et al. 2003). Gradually some of the CDECs took up different roles in the revitalization processes. The CDEC Rosemont-Petite Patrie (CDEC-RPP) initiated discussion and became a leading partner in the transformation of the Angus site to

ensure that it would contribute to improvement of the socioeconomic situation in the neighbourhood, rather than realization of shareholder benefit.

The *Société de Développement d'Angus* (SDA) is the organisation born out of the CDEC–RPP to take up this role. After long negotiations, CPR, the landowner, sold 23 ha, about half the remaining site, to the SDA, which became developer and manager of what is today Angus Technopôle (Figure 3.1). The CPR initially favoured selling the land, but owing to new environmental regulation and unfavourable property market conditions, it acted as developer 'by default'[3] for housing projects on 23 ha. Even if this was not the fastest way to mobilize the capital bound up in the site, as a large multinational, CPR had the financial assets to finance a development of this size, including soil remediation works. In consultation with the SDA, CPR also attracted some commerce. The City of Montréal and CPR handled and co-financed infrastructure development on the entire site, and the city of Montreal assumed the main costs and responsibilities for the establishment of the parks.

[FIGURE 3.1 NEAR HERE]

In 2008, the vast Locoshop continues to exist, partly mutated and reused successfully as a modern industrial mall and as a supermarket, and partly mutilated to make way for a new road and over-abundant parking space. The soil is decontaminated up to legal standards. Seven other industrial malls were constructed and constitute the Angus Technopôle. It hosts 44 (many high-tech related) companies, which are a mixture of both profit and non-profit organisations. One major and several smaller neighbourhood parks have been established. About 1,400 housing units have been constructed and are inhabited, mostly by well off residents seeking the quietness of the suburbs while being close to the city centre (Le Bel et al. 2005). A social economy catering service, child care, service flats for elderly people and a child centre for palliative care have also been established. Several pieces of the site await development as part of the Technopôle.

To provide an understanding of the project dynamics, Table 3.1 gives an overview of the main actors and some important dates. The following paragraphs focus on the various spatial claims and the related resource mobilization processes that made collective action possible within a context of dispersed resources. The first part focuses on the voicing of claims that both confronted and aligned interests and visions; the second zooms in on the mobilization processes from the moment a local compromise was negotiated and project implementation started.

[TABLE 3.1 NEAR HERE]

ANGUS TRANSFORMATIVE DYNAMICS AND CHANGING RELATIONS

Voicing claims

Logan and Molotch's (1987) "growth machine" paradigm explains how growth coalitions mobilize with the promise that growth benefits all through trickle down effects, and so succeed in trading off the use value of the majority for the exchange value of a few. This frequently makes territorial social conflicts invisible. By contrast, in the Angus case, territorial social conflicts were made visible. This is often the case when the functions, ownership status or user rights of land are temporarily undefined, or suddenly changed. Direct appropriation through occupation or squatting of underused landed property is an obvious means of giving voice to otherwise unheard actors and claims. This did not happen on the Angus site, but community activists did not wait for the last employee to be sent home before starting to brainstorm on possible futures for this large piece of urban land. Civil actors steered and triggered public debate to such an extent that it became impossible to ignore the existence of a collective claim: land development for jobs.

Developing visions

The central claim for jobs was not unique to the transformation of the Angus Locoshops, but part of a larger social movement in Montréal that organized itself around the issue of industrial reconversion (Fontan et al. 2003, 2005). The symbolic, economic and social importance of the Locoshops in the history of the neighbourhood, as well as its size and appearance, transformed it into a central, and also personal, target for community activists. The site's future was imagined as 'a structuring element of an industrial corridor along the railway-line, providing 2000 high quality jobs related to the new economy, accessible to the East Montreal inhabitants' (Ville de Montréal, 1990). The city council, at that time headed by the Montréal Citizens' Movement, was preparing its first Masterplan. The civil actors' visioning, which imagined how the Angus site might regain its strategic character in the economic development of Rosemont-Petite Patrie, was a welcome input to the plan[4]. A vast consultation process, the well developed communitarian milieu, comprising community actors and urban movements that had promoted local economic development in Montréal since the 1980s, and good relations between this milieu, and the politicians and officials in charge of the master planning process ensured that the City of Montréal included the consolidation of the industrial vocation of the land along the railway in its final First Masterplan (Ville de Montréal , 1992).

The civil actors had a vision. The initial ideas were discussed among community activists mainly from IFDEC, an institute for popular education and community development and CDEC-RPP. The CDEC-RPP then started to mobilize (see Table 3.2). However, few believed that the CDEC would succeed

in mobilizing the resources needed to acquire and develop the land. Nor did the statutes and mission of CDEC allow such actions. Consequently, the SDA, a non-profit developer, was established.

[TABLE 3.2 NEAR HERE]

First the CDEC, and later the SDA, worked hard to make the western part of the Angus Locoshops visible, attracting policy interest and public and private funding to redevelop the site while preserving heritage and incorporating the values of local development.

The first ideas and strategies developed informally around kitchen tables and in bars towards the end of the 1980s before the factory closed down. Furthermore, in December 1988 the IFDEC Montréal co-organized a conference, entitled "*Le local en Action*" which discussed ideas and experiences of community economic development practices (CED - for the north Americans) and local territorial development (for the Europeans). Creating partnerships between private business, labour movements, community movements, and institutional or public actors was identified as an essential tool for the future of local development (conference report ANDPL & IFDEC 1989). These partnerships would generate new social relations and modify actor mentality and behaviour (ibid). Influenced by such meetings, ideas developed for the Locoshops' future. Much was uncertain; however, it became clear that jobs, job training and the environment should be the main issues. Within this setting, partnerships for local development emerged and organized around old industrial space.

The local authorities were well connected with, and aware of the push for jobs within the community movement. Moreover the city administration, as well as a small number of heritage activists, was concerned with the preservation of Angus' heritage. CPR's request to demolish the Angus shops was rejected; it had to seek new uses for the remaining built structures, acting in concert with the city[5]. Finally, a feasibility study for the technopolis project stressed the value of Locoshop, and provided a further stimulus for its reuse.

The landowner, CPR, did not imagine a future for the area. At the moment of the Angus closure, the CPR's decision-making centre was no longer anchored in Montréal, and the company restructuring strategy aimed at the valorisation of its vacant and underused property[6]. The Angus site was perceived merely as a cost and a liability. CPR therefore directly approached the City officials with a proposal for a residential development project.

It is remarkable that the desires of the different actors (landowner, civil society actor, and local authority) became visible before the definition of a

formal project and that the actual existence of a brownfield induced local interactions between the different actors. The CDEC was the driving force in making spatial claims heard widely, using public debate and perseverance as its principal tools. The CPR in contrast would not consider the community as an interlocutor, and preferred direct negotiation on development plans with the city administration. Whereas these first steps in voicing claims consisted mainly of informal visioning processes without open confrontation, a second step, and therewith the first confrontation of claims, consisted of challenging the private ownership model and its supposed rights.

Claiming land that is not yours

The concept of property was central to the alignment of claims and the transformation of these into tangible results. This was the case for the landowner, who wanted to sell ownership rights to capitalize on the land value, as well as for the civil actor whose claim for the physical space was crucial to realizing the reconversion-for-jobs project. In fact, the main asset of brownfields is the availability of space. At the same time, access to space is crucial to gaining autonomy whatever the activity envisioned. By convention, land ownership and zoning are central concepts in defining which activities can take place at a particular location, who has access or not and under which conditions. Blomley (2003: xiv) graphically describes what we associate with landed property: "a restricted area, with boundaries and where in and out depends on whether you are granted the permission, or not". The division of land into privately held, demarcated plots creates one of the basic institutions of capitalist social relations, a system of inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore zoning regulations both protect and limit the freedom granted through property rights.

In the definition of the Angus brownfield transformation project, both zoning and the imagination of landownership, although as a collective property owned by the local community, have been of strategic importance. In imagining a future for the land and translating this into a plan, community activists contested the traditional ownership model and prevented the landowner from 'quietly enjoy[ing] its land'. In fact, whereas the property model has encouraged us to ignore the claims and aspirations of non-landowning actors, local activists here questioned the legitimacy of the model by claiming ownership of the land for the benefit of the community and using this as a local development lever in the form of a community land trust. Thus if CPR, owner of the Angus site, initially expected to operate its quasi monopoly to control 'its space', CDEC confronted this with a counter-claim; the longstanding relationship of workers with the Angus site justified the community's fight for jobs rather than acceptance of 'losing the space' by its transformation into residential space.

Forcing negotiations

A third crucial element in voicing-claims processes is the creation of active negotiations forums between different stakeholders. Aware of the existing claims, the local planning department, led by an ex-social activist, forced a dialogue between the competing interests. CPR, the landowner, wanted to realize a residential and commercial project and so increase the amount of land rent. However, a zoning change was needed to develop the programme, and as stated in the regulations this had to be publicly approved by a community assembly. The legal force of zoning thus became a crucial instrument in forcing negotiations, because the community had the power to reject the demand for change of land use, and so block CPR's project. Consequently, CPR, under pressure from the city administration, started to negotiate with the CDEC as an intermediary for the community.

In the meantime, the CDEC had realized the importance of mobilizing the community with an alternative vision. Through intensive relations with local media, the CDEC succeeded in transforming its own vision into a locally shared one and an empowering planning instrument. Community support guaranteed CDEC's power during negotiations with the CPR. However, after almost two years of negotiations without satisfactory results, the City Council acted strategically and fixed a date for the community assembly to vote for the zoning revision of the Angus shops (May 4th1994). The extra pressure led to a first agreement in 1994, and a refinement in 1998. The CDEC/SDA was granted preferential rights to gradually buy 23 ha for the development of a Technopôle; for the CDEC this achievement was a way of recognizing and remunerating the workers' sweat and energy poured into the site for almost a century. In exchange, CDEC would mobilize the community to support a zoning modification for the eastern part of the site.

Hence different voices where made heard (through visioning processes and claiming land) and confronted (through negotiations), so that conflicts settled down before the project-machine became fully functional. These dynamics were fundamental to the emergence of a project that started from lived concerns (in contrast to a fully planned project that receives a flavour of participation afterwards). Yet, the official planning moments (change of zoning and confirmation of industrial allocation in the master plan) are what generated official legitimacy for the strategic project. The CDEC/SDA project assumed a space of hope in the local milieu for democratization of urban space and economic development (SDA 1997). The project therefore was confronted with the challenge of integrating social, economic and political dimensions.

Putting the project-machine into motion

The Angus brownfield transformation project can be understood as the articulation of a variety of interacting mobilization processes and the negotiation of competing spatial claims voiced by actors after the Angus complex became available for new uses. The project itself, continuously driven by the civil actors, became an established institution and mobilizing force. The chapter goes on to explore the main resource mobilization processes and their impact on social relations, grouping them into three categories: conducting studies and external expertise, generating public debate to gain public attention and mobilize funds, and social entrepreneurship and organizational innovation.

The mobilizing role of studies and external expertise

From the moment of the early brainstorming exercises, the leading CDEC employees were surrounded by academics and activists mobilized through personal networks. Personal contacts with the city hall influenced the master plan, and forced the landowner into negotiations with the community-based organization. During the negotiations, they were assisted by volunteer engineers and lawyers. Later, after obtaining virtual ownership over the land, studies were fundamental to the mobilization of financial resources. In fact, the conduct of studies was a precondition for public support. Such expert studies are generally accepted tools in public and private actor milieus in the preparation of a formal project.

Consequently, the fact that a community-based actor agreed to comply with this more formal language and method of approach generated trust and further support. Indeed, 'the study phase appeared to be crucial, not necessarily in its outcome', Christian Yaccarini[7] remembers, 'but as a process and as a tool in generating legitimacy'. Throughout the project this technique of local project leadership combined with external expertise became a crucial way to steer content and approach and build support. For example, when the SDA was set up, its board of directors included several influential players from the Montréal business milieu. They brought in their personal knowledge and networks, and generated the trust that facilitated access to public and private funds.

Generating public debate

The generation of public debate was another key mobilizing process. The strategic use of the press and the involvement of non-conventional players to influence public opinion and disseminate a vision have been reported in other cases (e.g. Albrechts 2001). The CDEC/SDA was extremely successful in that respect. Headed by a social entrepreneur (a leader with powerful political skills), the organization ensured the near impossibility of denying of the collective claim on Angus. Not only was press attention pursued on every possible occasion, but articles frequently also included sharp comments or

strategic statements. By such methods, public debate constructed legitimacy. A project such as Angus Technopôle is not born at one particular moment, yet one could refer to a 'strategic project' from the moment the informal actors were able to influence the public debate. It is at this moment that spatial claims became claims shared by many. Residents and community-based actors strongly supported the CDEC and for politicians it became useful to be actively involved in the project.

The Angus site generated think-tank and negotiation coalitions, large-scale resident mobilization, and the emergence of media and local entrepreneurs; all these led to public debate and increased visibility of spatial claims. Visibility became strategic not only in the redevelopment of a concrete parcel of land, but also important ideologically. Press articles and interviews reveal that the debate became symbolic of the role civil actors could play in economic regeneration. Furthermore, strategic visibility assured access to public and private resources at various scales. Long-lasting support from individual politicians at all relevant scales assured access to public funds through programmes and cheap loans, as long as 'results' were delivered[8]. Political support at the local level was also crucial in formally legitimizing the claims of the community-based organizations. In addition, creative financing mechanisms contributed to public debate and project ownership. A public finance campaign for example (golf tournament, Angus beer, lottery, etc.), which symbolically sold land, did not directly raise large amounts of cash. Yet the large number of politicians, businessmen, unionists, urban elite and residents involved in the campaign, demonstrate its importance in mobilizing people around the project.

Public debate and the confrontation of overlapping and conflicting spatial claims resulted in a variety of opportunistic coalitions. They range from ephemeral cooperation to long-lasting coalitions, to pragmatic formal agreements between the civil society and the private actor, and between the private actor and the local government.

Emergence of a not-for-profit developer: social entrepreneurship and organizational innovation

The goals strived for by the civil society actor imposed the development of a new organization, which was able to: assume the role of project-leader, handle the articulation of different logics and processes, and connect desires, visioning, and planning and implementation practices.

The CDEC traditionally favoured connections between local economic actors, and assisted in development programmes, but would not normally act as developer. Besides the fact that it lacked the culture for doing this, it would be organizationally difficult. The SDA was established to overcome these problems, and had to play a crucial role in translating a locally shared vision

into actual spatial interventions. The not-for-profit developer therefore functions as a private developer but aims for community development instead of financial profit.

The SDA had a plan; it negotiated potential ownership rights and achieved legitimacy, but still had to mobilize the resources to actually develop the Technopôle as envisaged. Therefore the SDA constructed a network of connections, which linked it directly to favourable decision-making chains (Fontan, Klein, and Tremblay 2004). Focusing on converging interests and compromises, alliances were forced to ensure finance and the development of an attractive concept, which would attract viable, innovative companies that also had a social mission[9]. Further, SDA offered assistance and services to the companies implanted on the site. Hence, the civil society actor not only plays a role in the creation of jobs, but also in creating the conditions necessary to attract companies. Finally, SDA wanted to be a 'pole of local governance, based on partnership and an implication with the community in the realization of projects'. This implied an overall programme, which aimed at the integration of physical, institutional, economic, ecological and social change programmes. In order to realize its mission, SDA was forced to cooperate closely with a financially stronger party. Since 2004 therefore, *Fondaction*, a union related financial institution working in venture capital for the development of Québec's economy, became development partner.

INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

Interpreting heterogeneous claims and their consequences on the coalition formation

The above paragraphs show that the actors in the Angus project framed their claims differently according to the relations they had with the site, or the way in which they perceived it. The Angus shops were a symbol of modernity and settled prosperity, but also a symbol of changing economic geographies and a problematic socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the Angus shops were propertied space, to be prepared for another round of capital accumulation. The undefined status of the brownfield became an opportunity for the amplification and confrontation of spatial claims (Figure 3.2). The case also shows that the different spatial claims led to contestation as well as partnerships. This was not necessarily because the claims were shared, but because voicing claims made common interests (such as economic development) visible, and therefore forged coalitions. Initial conflict and a context of distrust thus gave way to more collaborative situations, yet with strongly divergent interests.

[FIGURE 3.2 NEAR HERE]

The capacity of the SDA executive director to understand and deal with the various spatial claims and link across established groups has been a key resource in fostering innovation in governance relations. It was at the root of the involvement of the cooperative financial institutions and higher level government tiers, which provided development resources. By understanding different spatial logics, confronting and combining them, he successfully generated trust among persons in business, academic and political milieus to the extent that they where ready to engage in exchanges across their traditional environment, trespass against formal rules and adapt to other ways of thinking in the interest of the common Angus project. The community leader, as well as Rosemont's current mayor and former community activist, were able to translate languages and concepts and act as bridge figures between the community and the urban elites. Yet, as will be shown, this bridging and 'scale-jumping' (Smith, 2006) also resulted in weakened relations with other community associations.

Social innovation?

The Angus case shows the extent to which a civil society actor can become involved in, drive forward and shape the redevelopment of a brownfield. The interaction of spatial claims related to the Angus Locoshops resulted in a brownfield transformation project that coordinated an *ad hoc* governance arrangement, which generated the capacity for action in a context of dispersed resources. While it was initially based on community development logics and local resources, the register of action shifted to connect to higher scale networks and politico-economical perspectives. The particular governance arrangement and the strong interconnection between a community organisation and labour union related risk capital makes it an interesting case study from a social innovation perspective.

The public actors assumed a mediating role. The strategic role of the local government explains part of the success of the unusual negotiations between a civil society actor and a large private developer. Furthermore the alliances between the civil society actor and the Montréal cooperative business milieu on the SDA board of councillors, who joined forces for local economic development, are crucial. Despite their different backgrounds and different relationships with the Angus site, the Montréal business personalities were ready to support the SDA because of the nature of the project (fostering economic development and job creation), and because of the leadership capacities of the civil society actor[10]. The coalition of private expertise supporting the civil society actor enabled communication with the private developer on shared terms. The combination of skilled civil society actors endowed with an entrepreneurial and political spirit, businessmen interested in assuming societal responsibilities and looking for personal challenges, public actors with an activist trajectory, and the CDEC culture led to a situation in which informal actors acquired visibility and legitimacy in the

public debate on economic and urban revitalization of East Montréal's industrial tissue.

Lowering investment barriers or controlling resources for social change?

The fact that brownfield revitalization fitted in with CDEC's mission of economic community development, added to its credibility and support. The CDEC/SDA primarily wanted to bring economic development to Rosemont-Petite-Patrie to benefit its residents. Dewar and Deitrick (2004) indicate two principal rationales for community organizations to do so: first, to control economic resources to benefit weaker social groups and to redirect economic opportunities to impoverished neighbourhoods; and second, to deal with market barriers in low income areas. The CDEC/SDA demonstrated leadership by demonstrating the potential for economic investment in a difficult area and by controlling economic resources (land, property development and management of a business park). The early strategies developed by the SDA explicitly emphasize business development, job training and broad community building (e.g. Comité de relance Angus 1997).

SDA became a strong organization on the economic reconversion scene, but gradually detached from neighbourhood and community development, when communication and cooperation with the neighbourhood decreased as well as its involvement in setting up social economy enterprises. Up-scaling of the SDA through partnership with public and private actors empowered it as an organization, but increased the gap with other community-based groups that continued to work at the neighbourhood level. Moreover, it is easier to mobilize for "jobs" than for "social change". The message of investment in jobs and economic revitalisation successfully mobilized residents, public and private business actors, and led to new social networks. Besides functioning as a platform for new initiatives (such as the social economy enterprises on site), the private sector alone would not have imagined the Angus project; nor would it have assumed the risk if the civil society actors had not provided the audacity and strategic skills and set an example in overcoming economic barriers to investment in the neighbourhood. The civil society actor combined the concept of a traditional business park with community development through job training and insertion programmes, standard adoption of ecological building techniques, transport reduction initiatives and mixed spatial development.

The Angus project was initiated and led by an organization that had emerged from the community. The community however has very little control over the SDA. Its resource base partly depends on its own functioning, but also on public funding and private capital. This partly confirms Stoecker's (1997) doubts about the community development corporation model as a viable alternative for urban development. Yet a project of this size would not have

been possible without an external financial base. Financers invested in the project because of shared or complementary missions of economic development, rather than for expectations of short-term profit. Still, a decrease in community-articulated agendas and the concentration on establishing economic activities indicates that SDA responded first to a funder's interest and only then to its social agenda. It shifted from a comprehensive social, economic and physical agenda towards economic-physical centred development activities. Since the start of the implementation works, SDA communications and year reports stress its role in property and economic development. They see their role as creating the conditions for a business location where public and private sector are willing to make new investments which will benefit the neighbourhood. Yet, labour training programmes, mediating activities in local governance or direct cooperation with the surrounding neighbourhood currently have no priority. A community group thus gained power to act in guiding investment in its neighbourhood, but to what extent such dynamics indeed improve socioeconomic equity remains an open question.

The project exemplifies a territorial mode of coordination in which the SDA leadership had the capacity to establish favourable conditions by generating public debate, setting up an impressive network and holding together all complex relationships and partnerships. Yet, if socially innovative governance arrangements mean democratic decision making structures in which residents, users, etc. also have an important say throughout a large part of the transformation processes, the Angus governance arrangement would not qualify as such. The success of the Angus transformation, as has been shown, is based on social entrepreneurship, i.e. local leadership and the ability to mobilize and combine a large range of resources in order to realize an appealing vision. Angus was not subject to the pressure of short-term financial profit, and therefore had the means to do something different, and to allow slower planning processes. Property rights on the Angus site generate power over access, the activities taking place there and influence the flows passing through the space. These in turn influence the social relationships constructed throughout the space (e.g. mixing social economy activities with a traditional profit economy in the long term generates new business communities sharing the values and logics of a plural economy (Klein et al. 2008)). The co-presence of these activities and the people they attract generates new interactions and initiatives.

Learning and institutionalization?

Social innovation refers not only to finding new ways of addressing locally perceived needs, but also to the learning and institutionalization of new practices (Fontan et al. 2004). I would suggest that one crucial impact of the Angus project is that it started to travel. Relations were forged around a particular brownfield, but continue to exist in relation to other, sometimes far

away, spaces. The SDA project travels in four ways. Primarily in Montréal, but also beyond, the project is regularly perceived as best practice (e.g. Leite 2008, Green Building 2008). Community groups also refer directly to the Technopôle as an example of what is possible or desirable, even if not necessarily evident. Secondly, the case was noticed by researchers with an interest in how traditional ownership and governance structures could be challenged and successfully contested (Fontan et al. 2005, Klein et al. 2008). Thirdly, the partnerships with private corporations and politicians were a means to gaining support for the SDA project, but led in the long run to the travelling of events and ideas. During interviews, several politicians and private actors referred to their involvement in the Angus project as an experience from which they learned personally and which led to the questioning of their working practices. Finally, financial resources were not abundant in 2006 and no major developments were in prospect, so looking outwards became a necessity. The Technopôle buildings paid for themselves, but do not generate income to run the SDA. The knowledge collectively built up over the last fifteen years through the development of the Angus project is now used outside the physical boundaries of the site. Time will prove whether or not this change marks the shift from SDA as an organization 'with a cause' into an urban not-for profit developer (Van Dyck, 2010).

CONCLUSION

The case study of Angus Technopôle shows the possibility to connect conflicting and overlapping spatial claims and go beyond purely profit oriented property-led urban development in strategic projects. The case suggests a project approach that starts *from* places and the aspirations of the local community in contrast with projects that are implemented *on* strategic locations. The analysis shows the opportunities strategic projects generate for co-productive spatial strategies. Yet, even if the brownfield transformation project is based on socially innovative partnerships, the analysis also shows how, paradoxically, these progressive approaches, contribute both to the transformation as well as to the reproduction of established social relations.

The Angus case illustrates the opportunities a community land trust can generate for the realization of an industrial project combining the social economy and high-tech based economic development. Moreover it directed eyes towards industrial green space in the city centre. The social innovation in social relations is most evident in the upscaling of organized civil society actors. Community actors and urban movements, in partnership with risk capital, give rise to a new form of corporatism, which in the long run may provide changes in governance regimes (see also Klein & Tremblay, 2009). Besides, the case shows the difficulty of going beyond learning effects within a very restricted group to wider empowerment. I would like to call therefore for renewed interest in combining the project approach with complementary strategies for resource redistribution, rather than betting solely on the

implementation of strategic projects to realize planning goals. Furthermore this case suggests that so called 'socially innovative' strategic projects share many similarities as governance devices with current neoliberal large-scale urban development projects. Both are based on socially innovative partnerships, piloted by small autocratic organizational forms, are spatially selective, and their impact on larger urban development processes and social inclusion is not monitored. Therefore it raises questions about the capacity of socially innovative strategic projects to break away from the urban growth machine. The main difference with the Angus project is that, due to the type of actors involved and their behavioural rationales, a variety of endogenous as well as exogenous resources were mobilized. The result is a project in which financial profit and property development are catalysts, but not the aim. The analysis thus points to the benefits of including civil society actors in urban development coalitions. It showed how the open confrontation of spatial claims led to the settling down in space of a locally negotiated compromise with an eye to the diversity of spatial uses. Nevertheless questions have to be asked concerning how and to what extent this steers resource allocation away from economic growth strategies and towards improving the living conditions and development capacities of weaker social groups in society.

Notes

[1] The author would like to thank the *Centre de recherche sur les innovations sociales à l'Université de Québec à Montréal,* and Jean-Marc Fontan and Jean-Louis Klein in particular, for sharing their reflections with me and providing access to key sources during the fieldwork. The author would also like to acknowledge the valuable contribution of editor Stijn Oosterlynck, who reviewed earlier versions of this chapter.

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[3] Interview with Pierre St-Cyr, former project manager for CPR, Montreal 24/05/07

[4] Interview with André Lavallée, current Mayor of Rosemont-Petite Patrie, officer in charge of the master plan in the early 1990s and Angus community activist in the 1970s, Montreal 04/06/2007

[5] Interviews with Elaine Gauthier, advisor at the city Department of Territory and Heritage Valorization, 08/09/2008 and with André Lavallée, current Mayor of Rosemont-Petite Patrie, officer in charge of the master plan in the early 1990s and Angus community activist in the 1970s, Montreal 04/06/2007

[6] Interview with Pierre St-Cyr, former project manager for CPR, Montréal 24/05/07

[7] Interview with Christian Yaccarini, director of the SDA, former CDEC employee and community activist, Montréal 31/05/2007

[8] Interview with Martin Cauchon, State secretary at Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Québec (1996-2002), Montréal 10/09/08

[9] Interview with Juan-Luis Klein, researcher and former SDA advisor , Montreal 31/05/07

[10] Interview with Léopold Beaulieu, Fondaction chairman and SDA councilor since 1995, Montréal 16/08/09

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Captions and Figures chapter 2

- **Figure 2.1: Transformation of the Angus Brownfield site (Rosemont-Petite Patrie, Montréal) into: (1) Technopôle - 23 ha, (2) residential zone - 23 ha and (3) commercial zone - 4 ha. Parks constitute 10% of the total new development**

- **Table 2.1: Key moments and key actors**

Key moments	Key actors
1904 - Implantation of Angus factories 1970s - First closure of part of the Angus factories 1992 - Final closure of the Angus factories and start of the CDEC mobilisation for jobs 1994 - Public assembly on zoning and first agreement between CPR and CDEC 1995 - Start of housing and commercial project 1998 - Agreement between CPR and SDA on concept of the industrial project and first land acquisition 1999 – Creation of *Insertech* (a social economy enterprise for work training in computer repair) 2000 – Opening of the restored Locoshop. 2008 - to be completed: part of the Angus Technopôle	Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) : *landowner 1904 until early 2000s, developer housing and commerce (1995-2006)* Organized civil society (CDEC-RPP, IFDEC, SDA, Insertech): *driving force Angus Technopôle* State actors (Local authority, provincial and national authorities): *mediation, financial support SDA and finance infrastructure and parks* Residents Rosemont-Petite-Patrie: *Angus Locoshop workers, referendum support Technopôle* Social economy related financial structures (Fondaction, Desjardins)

- **Table 2.2: Organization of the key civil society actors concerned in the transformation of the Angus Locoshops**

Key organization or key players	*Organizational form*	*Function*	*Mobilization*
IFDEC, researchers, active community, CDECs *(late 1980s-early 1990s)*	Professional associations, activists and researchers interact and exchange informally	Developing strategies of alternative development	Community organizations and urban movements, local political arenas
CDEC -RPP (early 1990s - 1996)	Professional community organization Link with research collective	Initiator of the Angus Technopôle project and set up of social economy enterprises (e.g. *Insertech*)	Wide mobilization in the local community (vote zoning plan, public finance campaign…), in the Montreal business and research milieus, in local and supra-local political arenas
SDA (1996 – 2004)	Not-for profit developer	Development of the Angus Technopôle	Mobilization in local business milieu, in political arenas, international exchange with civil society industrial reconversion initiatives,
SDA-FONDACTION partnership (since 2004)	Not-for profit developer in formal partnership with a pension fund	Development of the Angus Technopôle and expansion to other projects	Mobilization in local business milieus, international ethical capital

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- **Figure 2.2: Brownfield transformation dynamics for the Angus Locoshops**



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